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abstract
Being a book on art and its nature, Strange Tools deals with aesthetic experience as a crucial object of 
inquiry. Indeed, it offers several interesting insights into what aesthetic experience is and how we should 
(or should not) account for it. However, some aspects of Noë’s analysis raise questions, both about the act 
and about the object of aesthetic experience itself. In this paper, I will discuss these issues highlighting 
a potential conflict in the author’s analysis of aesthetic experience and providing some hints about the 
objective correlate of such an experience.
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THE “HOW” AND “WHAT” OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE
Strange Tools by Alva Noë is a book on art and artistic practice. However, since the topic is 
framed within a more general theory of human practices and (aesthetic) experience, it is also 
a book on perception, the human mind, and our nature as embodied beings who are embedded 
in a social and technological world.
Starting from some of the main theses and implications of this book, in this paper I would like 
to focus on two different aspects of the same topic, i.e. aesthetic experience.
Indeed, being a book on art and its nature, Strange Tools has to deal with aesthetic experience 
as a crucial object of inquiry: it therefore offers several interesting insights into what aesthetic 
experience is and how we should (or should not) account for it (Noë, 2015, pp. 51-54, 120-133). 
However, in my view, some points of Noë’s analysis seem to require further exploration and 
development – both a parte subjecti (i.e. the analysis of the act of aesthetic experience) and a 
parte objecti (i.e. the analysis of the object of aesthetic experience).
Regarding the former aspect, in the target book, Noë seems to present aesthetic experience 
against the background of a general enactive approach to perception, according to which 
perception is an active exploration of the surrounding world (Noë and O’Regan, 2001, p. 940). 
On the other hand, he presents aesthetic seeing as a kind of contemplative and detached seeing 
(Noë, 2015, pp. 51-52). The specific ways in which these two different conceptualizations can 
be held together and harmonized is not completely focused on by the author but it will turn 
out to be a crucial point to investigate further.
Regarding the second aspect, my thesis will be that Noë’s analysis of the proper object of 
aesthetic experience fails to consider some crucial features of such object. To be sure, Noë 
focuses on a specific kind of aesthetic object, i.e. works of art, describing how they should be 
accounted for and why they particularly matter to us. However, it seems reasonable to admit 
that there could be aesthetic objects that are not works of art, or, in other terms, that we can 
have an aesthetic experience of objects that are not works of art. In our everyday life, in fact, 
a poem or a piece of choreography may be experienced aesthetically as a natural landscape 
or the atmosphere of a city can. What – if anything – do these experiences have in common, 
so that we can call all of them “aesthetic experiences”? Moreover, more importantly, is there 
something that we detect in objects of experience that allows us to speak of various different 
aesthetic objects – some of which are works of art? 
Noë’s position on this point seems to be compatible with the idea that the peculiarity of 
aesthetic experience can be explained just by the specific – contemplative and detached – 




shape and color and size as neutral and pure, free of their everyday practical meanings. I 
will try to argue that this characterization of the objective correlate of aesthetic experience 
overlooks some of the specific features of everyday objects that can be crucially detected in 
aesthetic experiences themselves.
The aim of this paper, therefore, is twofold: to highlight some gaps in Noë’s analysis of 
aesthetic experience a parte subjecti, and to provide some hints about the objective correlate of 
this kind of experience for a more inclusive and multifaceted account a parte objecti. 
Before embarking on a critical analysis of Noë’s theory, it is worth summarizing some of the 
main tenets of this proposal, in order to better understand the background of the specific 
theses I will highlight and discuss.
As we said at the beginning, Strange Tools is a book on art and artistic practice, but it also 
outlines a more general theory of human practices and (aesthetic) experience, perception and 
the human mind, as well as our nature as embodied beings.
In his book, Noë starts by stressing how our lives are characterized by several organized 
activities, from breastfeeding to talking, from dancing to driving. Such activities shape us, our 
way of thinking and acting: in other words, we get organized by means of them. According to 
the author, organized activities are primitive and natural;1 they are ways of paying attention, 
looking, listening, doing, undergoing; they exhibit a structure in time; they are emergent 
and not deliberately controlled by any individual; they have a social, biological or personal 
function, and they are (at least potentially) pleasurable (Noë, 2015, pp. 3-10).
But there is another group of activities that are quite different from the ones just described. 
If dancing is an organized activity, choreography is not. Choreography is not dancing: 
choreography puts dance on the stage, it focuses and acts on it to show what dancing can be 
and how it can be worked on and re-organized. In this sense, if dancing is an organized activity, 
choreography is a re-organizational one. Indeed, according to Noë, we can think of there being 
two levels of activities (Noë, 2015, pp. 11-28). Level 1 is that of organized activities (e.g. talking, 
moving, dancing, singing). Level 2 is the level on which “the nature of the organization at 
the lower level gets put on display and investigated” (Noë, 2015, p. 29): in this sense, Level-
2-activities re-organize the lower-level ones. Among such Level-2-activities we can find 
choreography, as well as art and, interestingly, philosophy.
Coming to the main topic of the book then, art is not technology and artistic practice is not a 
technical activity (Noë, 2015, pp. 29-48). Activities such as dancing, singing, making pictures 
or sculptures are organized activities that may require very specific skills but are not artistic 
practices in themselves – let us think, for example, of children’s dancing, our singing to 
ourselves, or our making non-professional photos at a birthday party among friends. However, 
such activities can be re-organized, that is they can be put on the stage and investigated as a 
means of investigating ourselves and our nature as technological beings. Art puts our practices 
on display and shows how new and unfamiliar they can be. In this sense, works of art are strange 
tools: if technical activities produce different kinds of tools aiming at serving several different 
ends, art does not serve any particular purpose. It investigates what our Level-1-activities 
produce (e.g. songs, pictures, utensils, dance movements, and so on) and tries to make us see 
them under a new light: in this sense, when they become works of art, objects lose their practical 
utility. They do not serve a particular purpose and so they appear strange (Noë, 2015, pp. 49-71).
1  Noë underlines that “natural” is not to be intended in opposition to “learned” or “technological”. The idea is that 
natural organized activities are those activities that, even if learned against the background of new settings and 
technologies, once acquired, can be carried on in a smooth and natural way. See Noë (2015), p. 7. 
2. An Overview on 
Strange Tools
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Philosophy is a Level-2-activity too. Like art, philosophy investigates the mode of our 
organization and the way we are embedded in different organized activities. More particularly, 
it is the re-organizational practice that investigates and puts on display Level-1-cognitive 
undertakings such as reasoning, argument, belief formation, the work of science, and so on 
(Noë, 2015, p. 29). This characterization of philosophy leads Noë to maintain that “art is a 
philosophical practice and philosophy an aesthetic one” (Noë, 2015, p. 134).
Noë’s book is engaging and provoking. As this brief overview shows, it proposes a broad theory 
of human practices that tries to make sense not just of all different artistic productions but 
also of other human activities, such as philosophical work. Moreover, it frames the overall 
analysis of art in a specific theory of mind that criticizes the neuro-(aesthetic) approach and 
has its background in the enactive theory of perception and cognition that the author had 
proposed in previous works (Noë, 2004, 2009). The result is a broad overview that spans from a 
theory of art, to a theory of human practices, to a theory of mind, in a very captivating way.
However, far from being interested in (and capable of) discussing all the themes and research 
lines Noë has proposed in this book, as I said in the introduction I will concentrate on some 
specific theoretical issues his analysis of aesthetic experience raises, both a parte subjecti and a 
parte objecti.
One of the major targets of criticism in Noë’s theory is the neuro-aesthetic account of artworks 
and how they are experienced (Noë, 2015, pp. 120-133).
As for aesthetic experience in particular, the author maintains that even though it could be 
fruitful to know what happens in our brains while having such experiences, this does not tell 
us anything about what aesthetic experiences (not to mention works of art) are. Indeed, while 
every experience does elicit some particular events in the brain, this does not necessarily 
mean that the experience itself is reducible (both ontologically and epistemologically) to those 
events (Noë, 2015, pp. 130-131). Against this background, Noë criticizes the neuro-aesthetic 
approach as unable to account for the complex nature of the aesthetic attitude. Aesthetic 
experience, in fact, is not a finite and well-circumscribed reaction in the brain that can be 
measured and captured, at a given point in time, by means of neuroimaging methods. On the 
contrary, it is a temporally extended and multimodal engagement and exploration of the artistic 
work that can be transformed over time as long as the subject engages with the object and 
reflects upon it (Noë, 2015, pp. 120-133). Indeed, according to Noë, aesthetic responses are 
not fixed data points. They are more like the outcomes of an ongoing interaction with the 
object (or the work of art), which can be continuously shaped and informed by many different 
factors, such as what friends or critics tell us about that work, what we are interested in or 
focusing on, and so on. In Noë’s words:
A striking feature of aesthetic responses […] is that they are cognitive achievements, 
comparable, if not identical, to getting a joke. […] Aesthetic responses, then, are not 
symptoms or reactions or stable quantities. They are actions. They are modes of 
participation. They are moments of conversation (Noë, 2015, pp. 132-133).
This account of aesthetic experience seems to find its theoretical background in Noë’s 
theory of perception in general. Indeed, as the author himself says, no kinds of perceptual 
experiences are events «set off as a result of the bombardment of the nervous system from the 
outside» (Noë, 2015, p. 124). Rather, perceptual experiences are patterns of active interaction 
between the living being and its world.
As should be clear, therefore, Noë rejects the idea of aesthetic experiences as reactions in 
the brain in the same way as he rejects the idea that perceptual experiences are that kind of 
3. A Parte Subjecti 





reaction. He suggests, on the contrary, that both perception and aesthetic experiences are 
occurrences of active engagement with the world. 
However, what does this actually mean? How does Noë argue for this theoretical position? As 
I mentioned before, this idea finds its basis in the author’s enactive account of perception, so 
that we can say that Noë develops his account of aesthetic experience against the background 
of that theoretical proposal. Therefore, in order to understand better Noë’s account of 
aesthetic experience, as well as his criticism to the neuro-aesthetic approach, it is useful to 
introduce some crucial tenets of the enactive approach.
The enactive approach to (visual) perception has been developed principally by Noë (2004, 
2009), also in collaboration with the psychologist Kevin O’Regan (Myin & O’Regan, 2009; Noë & 
O’Regan, 2001).
One of the main tenets on which this theory is grounded is that having visual experiences 
does not mean holding a particular representation of the world. Seeing does not arise from 
having detailed internal representations of the way the world is. On the contrary, it is a way of 
interacting with the world. It is an activity of the organism that perceives – that is, a “mode of 
exploration of the world” (Noë & O’Regan, 2001, p. 940).
To explain their position, Noë (2004) and Myin and O’Regan (2009) start with the description 
of most of our daily visual experiences. When we look at the world around us in the best 
conditions possible, the objects we see seem to be in sharp focus and high-resolution. We seem 
to have perceptual access to a spatially and temporarily continuous world, where all things are 
more or less equally detailed (Myin & O’Regan, 2009, pp. 186-187; Noë, 2004, pp. 35-36).
However, things are not as simple as they might seem in the beginning. Let us consider, for 
instance, this written page. At first glance, we would say that it is uniformly written, and that 
it appears in our visual experience as uniformly detailed. However, if we fix our gaze, we will 
easily notice that we are not able to read many other words around the ones we are actually 
fixating. This is true even though it seems to us that there are some other distinguishable, 
readable and detailed words on the page. The same holds for colors. Even though we would 
say that all objects in our visual field are colored, we are not really able to say which color 
the things in the periphery of our visual field are. We can only distinguish colors when things 
move to the center of our visual field.
How can we account for this apparent paradox – that is, the fact that it seems to us that all 
things in our visual field are equally detailed, while we have a sharply focused and high-
resolution visual experience just of the objects in the center of the visual field itself?
According to Noë, we can experience the world around us as detailed and high resolution 
not because all details are visually detected in a single fixation, but because those details 
that are not actually seen are nevertheless experienced as perceptually (or virtually) present. 
When we stare at this written page, for instance, we cannot actually read (and see) all words 
simultaneously, nonetheless we have a perceptual sense of the presence of the now-unreadable 
words. This perceptual sense makes us have the experience of a uniformly written and 
detailed page (Noë, 2004, pp. 60-65).
Now, the interesting point for our purposes is that, according to Noë, unseen details can 
be perceptually present because they are accessible through movement. The world is made 
perceptually available for us thanks to our ability of looking around. Indeed, we can move our 
eyes or our body and we can gain access to the world in its richness. In this sense, according 
to the proponents of the enactive theory of perception, the world appears to be detailed not 
because we can see all the details in a single fixation, but because we find them “whenever we 
look for them” (Myin & O’Regan, 2009, p. 187). The details in the visual field are accessible – that 
is, they are reachable and explorable thanks to our ability to move. This is the reason why we 
have a sense of the presence of the world as complete and high-resolution even though we 
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cannot really see every single detail in each visual fixation.
In this sense, perception depends on my implicit understanding of the way I can access the 
world by movement. Let us think, for instance, of our perceptual experience of a cat that sits 
motionless behind a picket fence (Noë, 2004, p. 60). According to Noë, we do have a sense of 
presence of the whole cat – even though we can actually see only those cat-parts that are not 
occluded by the picket fence – because we implicitly understand that, by moving our eyes, 
head, or body, we can bring into view those parts of the cat that are now hidden. Those parts 
of the cat’s body, therefore, are perceptually present as accessible by movement (Noë, 2004, p. 64).
In this framework, seeing is conceived as an exploratory activity (Noë & O’Regan, 2001, pp. 
939-940). The perceiver has the ability to move around in her environment and has an implicit 
understanding of how the world changes while she moves. According to the proponents of 
the enactive theory of perception, it is partly thanks to these abilities that the perceiver can 
have the visual experiences she has. Our visual experiences are therefore the result of an 
exploratory activity that, obviously, depends importantly on our embodied nature and our 
kinetic and practical abilities.
This theoretical background gives us some clues to interpreting Noë’s thesis according 
to which, like perception in general, aesthetic experience too is not a finite and well-
circumscribed reaction in the brain, but rather an ongoing interaction with the object 
(Noë, 2015, pp. 132-133). The idea seems to be that aesthetic experience, like perception, is 
a multimodal (sensory but also thoughtful) and temporally extended way of exploring and 
investigating the object (e.g. the work of art). In this sense, it cannot be reduced to a kind of 
instantaneous and fully detailed snapshot of aesthetic objects, just as visual experience cannot 
be reduced to a high-resolution snapshot of the visual field.
However, the enactive account of visual perception stresses also the active nature of the 
interaction with the objects of perception. I can see the whole cat behind the picket fence – or 
the entire visual scene as uniformly detailed – because the unseen details are available thanks 
to my ability to move. I can move around the visual objects, actively exploring all their profiles 
and then acquiring a visual image of the objects themselves as three-dimensional things. 
Movement and actions have a crucial role here.
However, what are the characteristics of aesthetic exploration? In what specific sense is 
aesthetic experience enactive? How much is it based on movement and active engagement? 
Noë seems not to focus explicitly on these issues in his book, preferring to present aesthetic 
experience against the background of an enactive theory of perception rather than proposing 
an enactive theory of aesthetic experience itself (personal communication). However, 
disentangling these issues can turn out to be crucial in light of the way Noë himself keeps 
describing the aesthetic experience. Indeed, the author compares and contrasts aesthetic 
seeing with what he calls “seeing in the wild” (Noë, 2015, pp. 51-56). Seeing in the wild is 
«active, embedded, subordinate to task, an openness to our world rather than […] a state of 
reflection on or contemplation of the world» (Noë, 2015, pp. 51). This is the way in which we 
are usually directed towards the world in our everyday life: when we drive, prepare dinner or 
clean our apartment we see the world as the correlate of our practical goals, embedded as we 
are in the given situation. On the contrary, according to Noë, aesthetic seeing is contemplative 
and detached, and the world opens up as a set of objects that are there just to be seen. 
Aesthetic seeing, then, requires the ability to «disengage with the world thoughtfully, or to 
reflect on the world around […] as if the world were a picture to be inspected» (Noë, 2015, p. 
55). Aesthetic experience, in other words, is a kind of disengaged way of thinking about the 
world or contemplating it.
However, how can this characterization of aesthetic seeing be compatible with Noë’s account 
of aesthetic perception against the background of a general enactive theory of perception, 
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which has in the active engagement with the world one of its hallmarks? How should we 
conceive the aesthetic ongoing interaction with objects in order for it to be not at odds with 
the contemplative, detached and disengaged character of aesthetic experience itself?
It seems there are ways in which these two aspects of Noë’s characterization of aesthetic 
experience may be compatible. However, in his book, Noë does not seem to focus on this 
aspect, leaving a possible issue of his account unresolved.
Moreover, a more developed characterization of the main traits of aesthetic experience as 
an ongoing interaction and exploration would be crucial. How should we consider such an 
engagement with respect to the different kinds of objects we can experience aesthetically? Let 
us think, for instance, of Noë’s description of Richard Serra’s sculptures (Noë, 2015, pp. 77-79, 
85). More than sculptures, these works are cityscapes that the observer needs to enter and 
actively explore in order to really appreciate them. In this case, the aesthetic experience could 
be described very well by an enactive account. Yet, what about the enactment of a musical 
piece or a painting, for instance? Could this be of the same kind as the one we perform with 
Serra’s sculptures? If not, what kind of active engagement would it be? Noë does not explicitly 
focus on these issues: he deals with different works of art, such as sculptures, paintings and 
musical pieces, but he does not give us a systematic account of the different features that 
aesthetic active engagement should have in these different cases.
In conclusion, therefore, my hypothesis is that Noë’s reading of aesthetic experience against 
the background of an enactive theory of perception – which is an interesting and potentially 
very fruitful position – could be more convincing if it explicitly tackled the issues raised here, 
since they seem to be crucial for an account of the nature of aesthetic experience itself.
In the previous paragraph, I tried to show that some points in Noë’s analysis of aesthetic 
experience need to be specified further in order for us to better understand the nature and the 
main features of the subjective act involved (a parte subjecti analysis). However, what about the 
analysis of the object of aesthetic experience (a parte objecti analysis)?
As I mentioned in the introduction, my thesis is that in Noë’s book the analysis of the proper 
object of aesthetic experience fails to consider some crucial features of such object.
To be sure, Noë mainly focuses on a specific kind of aesthetic objects, i.e. works of art. 
However, as the author himself admits, the aesthetic sense is not just an art sense (Noë, 
2015, p. 56). We can experience aesthetically a natural landscape, the atmosphere of a city, 
the interior design of an apartment, and so on. Potentially, every object can be experienced 
aesthetically.
In this sense, Noë’s analysis does not seem to be committed to a too narrow account of the 
objects of aesthetic experience. However, the crucial point that has to be addressed is whether 
there are some peculiar aspects that we detect in the objects of perception when we are 
aesthetically oriented towards them. In other terms, the point is whether there is a specific 
objective correlate of the aesthetic attitude that is experienced in aesthetic perception as 
different, for instance, from general perceptual experience. 
In Noë’s theory, such an objective correlate seems to be the object in itself. Noë maintains that 
the peculiarity of aesthetic experience is the specific – contemplative and detached – attitude 
that characterizes it. Indeed, differently from non-human animals, human beings can and do 
often assume the aesthetic (thoughtful, reflective, and disengaged) attitude towards the world 
around them (Noë, 2015, pp. 52-57). Such an attitude seems to have its correlate in the pure 
and neutral object, free of its everyday practical meanings. In this way, pure shapes, colors and 
sizes are there just to be seen and inspected (Noë, 2015, pp. 52-53).
My hypothesis, however, is that such a characterization of the objective correlate of aesthetic 
experience overlooks some of the specific features to be found in everyday objects that can be 
4. A Parte Objecti 
Analysis: What 
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detected as being crucial in aesthetic experiences themselves. Let us clarify this point.
Experiencing the world aesthetically means also being affected by it, in a positive or negative 
way. We can be attracted or disgusted by the objects around us. We can be struck by the dreamy 
gracefulness of the Clair de lune of Dubussy’s Suite Bergamasque, as well as by the elegance and 
delicacy of the movements of a dancer. On the other hand, we can be disgusted by an abandoned 
and polluted natural landscape or by the violence and aggressiveness of the behavior of a man 
against a woman. What is that strikes us affectively in these objects? Is it just the pitch and 
loudness of the notes in Debussy’s music or the directions in space of the movements of the 
dancer or of the man against the woman? Is it just the colors of the natural landscape?
My hypothesis is that it is not the case that the primary or secondary qualities of the objects of 
our world affect us in aesthetic experience. It is not the shape, the color, or the size per se that 
strike us. Rather, it is their qualities of being elegant, or graceful, aggressive or violent.
What kind of qualities are these?
The phenomenological and Gestalt traditions called them “tertiary qualities”, to recall the 
classical distinction between primary and secondary qualities that, as is widely known, has 
characterized philosophical thought from the beginning and has been stressed by many 
authors – from Democritus to Galileo to John Locke (Bozzi, 1990). Differently from primary 
qualities – that pertain to the domain of measureable quantities such as weight and size 
– and secondary qualities – that pertain to the domain of sensible features such as odours 
and colours – tertiary qualities appear as the multitude of expressive, aesthetic qualities that 
objects may reveal to us. The brightness of a shade of red, the gloominess of black, the solemnity 
of a public and institutional ceremony, the melancholy of a sunset. All of these qualities can 
affect us, positively or negatively. This is the reason why they have been also labelled the 
“attractive” and “repulsive” features of the objects in the world around us (Lewin 1935).2 
If aesthetic experience also means being affected by the seen objects (both sensibly and 
intellectually), and if aesthetic responses can be characterized as a kind of “visual evaluation” 
or “judgements”, as Noë himself maintains (Noë, 2015, p. 55, 132), then expressive qualities 
seem to be an adequate correlate of aesthetic experience itself. They are exactly those valuable 
– positive or negative – features that the objects of our world show and that can affect us 
because of their power to attract or repel.
In his book, Noë seems to overlook these specific features of the objective correlate of 
aesthetic perception. Yet, it would have been particularly crucial to consider them also 
to avoid reducing aesthetic experience merely to a kind of intellectual and detached 
contemplation. In fact, aesthetic experience can be said to be different, for instance, from 
scientific observation or meditative contemplation of the world exactly because it is evaluative 
and because it involves affective responses to the objects in the world. In my view, this is 
possible because aesthetic seeing detects the sensible, attractive or repulsive, features of our 
world. An account that does not deal with these qualities, therefore, risks ignoring a crucial 
aspect of the objective correlate of aesthetic seeing itself.
Moreover, a (phenomenological or Gestalt-based) theory of expressive qualities actually seems 
to be compatible with Noë’s account of aesthetic seeing and perceptual experience in general. 
Indeed, Noë maintains that, in perception, we do not just detect colors, shapes, or sounds. We 
do perceive meanings. We do perceive affordances, for instance, in the Gibsonian sense (Gibson 
2  Kurt Lewin used the term “Aufforderungscharakter” to refer to the positive and negative valences that characterize 
the objects in the environment and that orient our behavior. See Lewin, K. (1935). Based on this term, James J. Gibson 
coined the term “affordance”, which is very well-known today in the debate about the philosophy and psychology of 
perception, and about the relation between perception and action (Gibson 1979). 
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1979) – that is, we perceive the practical opportunities and obstacles the environment offers to 
us. Likewise, in music perception we do not perceive mere sounds, but sounds as the outcome 
of the musicians’ gestures and actions; just as, in listening to a conversation, we perceive 
words as meaningful and expressive of one’s thoughts (Noë, 2015, pp. 182-190). In Noë’s 
account, therefore, meanings seem to be what is primarily given in perception.
In the phenomenological and Gestalt-based account of expressive qualities (Bozzi, 1990; 
Scheler, 1923; Köhler, 1938; Ingarden, 1931; Arnheim, 1954), such qualities are described 
exactly as the primary datum of perception, not just as a set of features subsequently projected 
on the neutral object of perception. Indeed, expressive qualities can be perceived before – 
sometimes even without – the recognition of the elements that contribute to their emergence. 
As Max Scheler says, for instance
I can tell from the expressive “look” of a person whether he is well or ill disposed towards 
me, long before I can tell what colour or size his eyes may be (Scheler, 1923, p. 244).
In the same way, when staring at a fireplace we perceive the flowing movement of the fire and 
the brightness of the colors before or without necessarily focusing on the different shades of 
red or on the geometrical shapes and the speed of the flames (Arnheim, 1954, pp. 369-375). 
Likewise, we can perceive the solemnity of a ceremony or the joyful atmosphere of a party 
long before focusing on the interior design of the place or on the objects’ colors.
After having been perceived, expressive qualities can then guide us in analyzing the structural 
elements from which they have emerged. According to Mikel Dufrenne (1953), for instance, 
the analysis of the aspects contributing to expressiveness can actually be done only after the 
expressive quality itself has been perceptually grasped. We need, for instance, to experience 
the vigor of César Franck’s Prelude, Chorale and Fugue in order to recognize that it (partly) 
depends on the development of the themes, on rhythm and on the final modulation from 
the minor to the major scale. Similarly, we first recognize the mysterious grace of Debussy’s 
The Girl with the Flaxen Hair and then we attribute it to the uncertainty of the rhythm and the 
instability of the tonality (Dufrenne, 1953, p. 441).
These remarks also allow us to highlight another crucial aspect of the phenomenological and 
Gestalt-theory’s analysis of expressive qualities. Such qualities are not projected on objects 
by the subject who perceives them, but emerge in the objects themselves on the basis of the 
elements such objects are composed of, and the way in which these elements are structured. 
Authors such as Moritz Geiger or, more recently, Paolo Bozzi harshly criticized, for instance, 
the thesis according to which expressive qualities are just affective features projected on 
objects on the basis of the affective responses of the subject involved (Geiger, 1910, 1911; Bozzi, 
1990). Criticizing this idea, indeed, Bozzi (1990) noticed that our affective responses to the 
objects around us are not necessarily akin to the expressive quality we recognize in the objects 
themselves. If Anne is sad and not well-disposed and she goes to a cheerful and joyful party, she 
can be perfectly able to recognize the happy atmosphere of the party without being infected 
by it in any way; on the contrary, she could be much more bothered and annoyed because of 
it (Bozzi, 1990, pp. 103-104). In the same way, the brutality of a murder can evoke as many 
different responses as the different individuals taking a position on it – it can evoke revenge, 
for example, or forgiveness, or it can also remain completely ignored by some. Yet, the brutal 
character of the murder or the cheerful and happy atmosphere of the party still remain there, 
in the objects themselves; they just evoke different affective responses in different people.3
3  Songhorian and I previously discussed these examples in Songhorian, S., Forlè, F. (2015).
27
THE “HOW” AND “WHAT” OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE
Expressive qualities, therefore, seem to emerge from objects themselves, based on how these 
objects are structured. This position tries to recognize what Pinotti called “the object’s rights” 
(Pinotti, 2005, pp. 15-20) – that is, the fact that objects have to present certain distinct features 
rather than others in order to have specific expressive and aesthetic qualities. In this sense, 
not any color can be gloomy, just as not any atmosphere can be joyful and cheerful. There are 
some objective aspects that cannot be easily drowned out by subjective projections.
Gibson said something similar about affordances. Affordances are the opportunities and the 
obstacles that the environment offers to the animal (Gibson, 1979, p. 127). They depend both 
on the features of the objects and on those of the animal involved – for instance, a little hole in 
the wall can afford hiding for a butterfly, but not for an elephant.
However, this does not mean that affordances are not in the objects themselves, or that they 
change according to the animal’s need. Affordances are what the environment offers to the 
animal, regardless of the fact that the animal notices or exploits them or not. Underlining 
this crucial aspect, Gibson says that “[t]he object offers what it does because it is what it is” 
(Gibson, 1979, p. 139).
Gibsonian affordances can be recognized as a subset of tertiary qualities: they are valuable 
aspects of the world, either positive (opportunities) or negative (obstacles), which can attract 
or repulse us. In addition, they are qualities of the objects themselves, not just projections of 
our subjective needs or acts.
As this brief presentation tries to show, tertiary qualities are much more widespread than it is 
usually thought. Some of them emerge particularly in aesthetic experience, making the latter 
not just a detached and contemplative seeing but also an affectively-connoted and evaluative 
experience. Recognizing Gibsonian affordances as part of the objective correlate of perception, 
Noë’s position does not seem to be incompatible with a phenomenological and Gestalt-based 
account of expressive, tertiary qualities. The hypothesis of this paper is that Noë’s account of 
aesthetic experience and its objective correlate could actually benefit from bringing tertiary 
qualities into the picture.
Strange Tools is a very provoking and ambitious work. It presents an overall theory that, 
because of its strong as well as original theses on the one hand, and its debatable passages on 
the other, may be a promising candidate for opening a new field of discussion at the interface 
between aesthetics, the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action.
What I have stressed in this paper, however, is the need to specify some aspects of aesthetic 
experience, both a parte subjecti and a parte objecti. On the one hand, I highlighted a potential 
conflict between Noë’s reading of aesthetic experience against the background of an enactive 
theory of perception and the aesthetic detached and contemplative attitude. On the other 
hand, I have suggested how the features of the objective correlate of aesthetic seeing may be 
specified, trying to find a way to account for the affective and evaluative character of aesthetic 
experience itself. My thesis is that specifying aesthetic seeing on both the issues I raised here 
may be useful for Noë’s account, also in providing a wider background for one of the main 
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